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At the intersection of two entrenched principles—freedom from workplace discrimination[1] and 
unfettered religious practice[2]—sits a doctrine called the ministerial exception.[3] The doctrine gives 
deference to religious institutions’ internal employment practices regarding its “ministers,” providing 
immunity from employment discrimination claims. First discussed in the aftermath of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964,[4] the doctrine permeated lower courts for decades before the Supreme Court finally 
granted it ultimate legitimacy in 2012.[5] 
Two distinct components comprise the doctrine. To avail itself of the ministerial shield, (1) the 
employer must be sufficiently religious in nature[6] and (2) the employee at issue must fall into the 
category of “ministers.”[7] While the doctrine is not a license for any employer, claiming a 
tangential brush with religion, to fire anyone it pleases with impunity, it takes little imagination to 
envision how the lines are often blurred.
Just how wide is the “minister” umbrella? What types of employees can a religious employer fire[8] 
for an otherwise illegal reason[9] and still avoid a torrent of legal action by invoking the ministerial exception? Though the Circuits have fashioned their 
own criteria,[10] the overarching consideration “hinges on whether the court views the employee as important or unimportant to the [employer’s] spiritual 
mission….”[11] When the Court gave the ministerial exception its blessing in Hosanna-Tabor, it declined to enumerate a clear test.[12] Now, eight years 
later, the Court has again refused to provide a clear test, but has expanded the doctrine nonetheless.
In July’s Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, the Court held that two elementary teachers at parish schools were “ministers” for the 
purposes of the exception, barring their discrimination claims.[13] The 9th Circuit had refused to apply the ministerial exception, holding the teachers 
played only small roles in the religious mission of the school, as opposed to leadership roles “mostly teaching religion from a book.”[14] The Court, led by 
Justice Alito, reversed. Alito admonished the 9th Circuit (and the dissenters) for advocating a “rigid test,”[15] noting the Court’s ruling in Hosanna-Tabor 
“called on courts to take all relevant circumstances into account and to determine whether each particular position implicated the fundamental purpose of 
the exception.”[16] 
The Court did, however, make it clear that an employee does not have to identify as a “minister” by name or title, be ordained, nor practice the religion at 
issue—and teachers at religious institutions plainly fall into the category of employees under the doctrine.[17] “What matters, at bottom, is what an 
employee does . . . [The exception] should apply to any ‘employee’ who leads a religious organization, conducts worship services or important religious 
ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith.”[18] Importantly, in determining the teachers fell under the exception, the Court 
emphasized that they “performed vital religious duties.”[19] 
While the Court suggests employee duties are paramount to its analysis, its focus appears to point elsewhere. The Court structures its decision on the 
foundation of the religious institution’s own determinations—mainly how it views its employees’ roles within its own religious framework. “While he 
purports to focus on employees, Justice Alito’s test seems to distill to three questions: does the organization have a religious mission, does it perceive the 
employee to advance that mission, and do formal documents like employment agreements indicate a religious role?”[20]
This ruling’s broad language, focus on the religious nature of the institution, deference to the employers’ determinations regarding employees’ roles, and 
emphasis on case-by-case determinations in lieu of a bright-line test, could swallow up hundreds of thousands of traditionally secular employees in its 
wake. Justice Sotomayor, dissenting in Morrissey-Berru, warned of as much.[21] 
The most significant block of employees potentially affected are medical practitioners—doctors, nurses, technicians, and other clinical or laboratory staff—
at religious hospitals.[22] There is little doubt that a religious hospital would easily meet the religious institution requirement,[23] and the argument for 
classifying secular medical practitioners as “ministers” would foreseeably amount to claiming they “perform vital religious duties” and are “important to 
the hospital’s spiritual mission.”[24]  Perhaps a doctor, saving lives under the rules and guidelines of a Catholic or Jewish hospital, is quite literally doing 
the Lord’s work. Tangible proof of that spiritual connection is not hard to find. Medical practitioners at religious hospitals are more often than not required 
to agree to religious mission statements (i.e., Ethical and Religious Directives [ERDs] in Catholic-run institutions) as a requirement for employment.[25] That 
agreement could bolster any argument alleging those doctors, nurses, and technicians are a part of the hospital’s “spiritual mission.” 
Over the next few years, we will see whether the ministerial exception reaches out and grabs employees beyond teachers at parochial schools, or if it 
remains a relatively narrow doctrine. In other words, whether fears of emboldened religious hospitals discriminating at will prove “prescient, alarmist, or 
somewhere in-between.”[26]
Here is the obvious question: the next time a physician or a nurse alleges age, disability, sex, or orientation discrimination against a religious hospital and 
the hospital claims the ministerial exception—how will the lower courts interpret the expanded doctrine? But looking outside the realm of litigation, another 
salient question emerges: how will hiring practices at religious institutions change in the shadow of a broader doctrine? It is no secret that religious 
advocacy organizations are already cognizant of the ministerial exception and are not shy about advising religiously affiliated institutions as to how to 
weaponize the doctrine.[27] For decades, the exception has served as a shield. Now, at the very least, the Court is signaling to religious hospitals they 
might try wielding it as a sword. 
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